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Abstract: Secure management of Australia's commercial Critical Infrastructure presents ongoing challenges to 
both the owners of this infrastructure as well as to the Australian Federal government. The security management 
process is currently managed through high-level information sharing via collaboration, but does this situation suit 
the commercial sector? One of the issues facing Australia is that the majority of critical infrastructure resides 
under the control of the business sector and certain aspects such of the critical infrastructure such as Supply 
Chain Management (SCM) systems are distributed entities that span a number of commercial organisations. 
Another issue is that these SCM systems can be used for the transportation of varied items, such as retail items 
or food. This paper will explore the security issue related to food SCM systems and their relationship to critical 
infrastructure. The paper will focuses upon the security and risk issues associated with SCM system protection 
within the realms of critical infrastructure protection. The paper will review the security standard ISO 28000 -
Supply Chain Security Management Standard. The paper will propose a new conceptual security risk analysis 
approach that will form the basis of a future Security Risk Analysis approach. This new approach will be aimed at 
protecting SCM systems. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of the paper is to evaluate how Australia is protecting its key Cil's (Critical Information 
Infrastructure) in terms of security and risk. The paper focuses on the security issues that relate to key 
CII such as Supply Chain Management Systems (SCM). One of the key issues that Australia faces is 
developing strategies and implementing national policies from a security viewpoint, in terms of 
protecting its CII and its relationship with SCM. The CII runs the day-to-day life of Australians, 
operates gas and electricity supplies, banking and finance sectors, airports and transports, defence 
forces, telecommunications and government departments. 
Within Australia, an annual national Computer Crime and Security Survey is undertaken to assess the 
sort of computer crime occurring within Australia. An earlier AusCERT survey (AusCERT, 2004) 
identified that organisational ignorance of criticality status could potentially undermine the reliability 
and security of Australia's CII, as these organisations are utilising the CII without realising their risk 
liability. The last AusCERT survey (AusCERT, 2006) showed that of the sample, only 34% of the 
organisations had indicated that they were part of the CII, which is a lower percentage than one would 
expect. Therefore organisational ignorance of criticality status could potentially undermine the 
reliability and security of Australia's CII, as these organisations are utilising the CII without realising 
their risk liability. 
2. Australia's critical infrastructure 
Historically, much of Australia's infrastructure was originally owned and operated by the public sector 
at the Federal, state and local government levels (Smith, 2004). However the majority of Australia's 
critical infrastructure has now been privatised and is under private sector ownership. Consequently, 
protecting Australia's critical infrastructure now requires a higher level of cooperation between all 
levels of government and the private sector owners. The Federal government has developed a policy 
for critical infrastructure protection that focuses broadly on addressing the following strategies 
(Australian Government, 2004, AGO, 2004): 
Distinguishing critical infrastructures and ascertaining the risk areas; 
Aligning the strategies for reducing potential risk to critical infrastructure; 
Encouraging and developing effective partnerships with state and territory governments and the 
private sector; 
Advancing both domestic and international best practice for Critical Infrastructure protection. 
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The Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) is a forum in which the owners and operators of-
critical infrastructure work together by sharing information on security issues which affect Critical 
Infrastructure (TISN, 2007). TISN requires the active participation of CIP owners and operators of CIP 
infrastructure, regulators, professional bodies and industry associations, in cooperation with all levels 
of government, and the public. To ensure this cooperation and coordination, all of these participants 
should commit to the following set of common fundamental principles of CIP (TISN, 2007). These 
principles are (TISN, 2007): 
Jt- -4:-01 P .. i s-eentred ~0n~tl9e-Aeed~tom in i m ise~risks~topubl icrllealth,--safety-anEl~c0nfidenee;-enstJre~--· .-----------
economic security, maintain Australia's international competitiveness and· ensure the continuity of 
government and its services; 
m 2. The objectives of CIP are to identify critical infrastructure, analyse vulnerability and 
interdependence, and protect from, and prepare for, all hazards; 
m 3. As not all Critical Infrastructure can be protected from all threats, appropriate risk management 
techniques should be used to determine relative severity and duration, the level of protective 
security, set priorities for the allocation of resources and the application of the best mitigation 
strategies for business continuity; 
• 4. The responsibility for managing risk within physical facilities, supply chains, information 
technologies and communication networks primarily rests with the owners and operators; 
• 5. CIP needs to be undertaken from an 'all hazards approach' with full consideration of 
interdependencies between businesses, sectors, jurisdictions and government agencies; 
• 6. CIP requires a consistent, cooperative partnership between the owners and operators of 
Critical Infrastructure and governments; 
• 7. The sharing of information relating to threats and vulnerabilities will assist governments, and 
owners and operators of Critical Infrastructure to better manage risk; 
• 8. Care should be taken when referring to national security threats to Critical Infrastructure, 
including terrorism, so as to avoid undue concern in the Australian domestic community, as well 
as potential tourists and investors overseas; 
• 9. Stronger research and analysis capabilities can ensure that risk mitigation strategies are 
tailored to Australia's unique Critical Infrastructure circumstances. 
The Food Chain Assurance Advisory Group (the Food Chain Group) forms part of the TISN. The 
primary aim of the Food Chain Group has been to improve the security of the agriculture and food 
supply chain in the changed global security environment. The existing food safety and security 
systems and food regulatory arrangements are primarily aimed at preventing and detecting natural or 
accidental risks. The new challenge is to ensure these systems are now capable of responding to the 
new increased potential for acts of deliberate and malicious intervention (including cyber based 
activities) (FCIAAG, 2007). 
In an Australian context, the issue is the geography of Australia, a country larger than Europe with a 
population of 21 million, the majority of the population is located in a few cities. This means any 
disruption to the key SCMs, e.g. food would have a direct impact upon the population centres of 
Australia. 
The Australian government has identified a new security challenge, 'it is increasingly evident that the 
sophistication of our modern community is a source of vulnerability in itself. For example, we are 
highly dependent on computer and information technology to drive critical industries such as aviation; 
electricity and water supply; banking and finance; and telecommunications networks. This 
dependency on information technology makes us potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks that may 
disrupt the information that increasingly lubricates our economy and system of government' (Rudd, 
2008). This public acknowledgement by the Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, identifies the new 
security challenge facing CII and SCM systems. 
3. The electronic supply chain 
Prior research into SCM (Pye et ai, 2005) had identified that Supply chain, value chain, demand 
chain, critical chain, and supply network are terms used somewhat interchangeably in the literature to 
refer to a conceptual chain of cooperating business partners that facilitates the bi-directional flow of 
241 
Matthew Warren and Shona Leitch 
information and goods and services to which it adds cumulative value from raw materials to the 
consumer. The following figure shows the characteristics of a supply chain. 
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Figure 1: The conceptual characteristics of a supply chain. (Pye et ai, 2005) 
As described by Pye (Pye et ai, 2005), consider a hypothetical supply chain for Corn Flakes. 
Business A represents a corn farmer who supplies corn to Business C, the corn processor. Business 
B represents a wood chipper that supplies to Business D, the packaging manufacturer. The corn 
processor and the packaging manufacturer (Businesses C and D) supply processed corn and 
packaging to Business E; Kellog's who then make and package the Corn Flakes. Kellog's finally 
supply packaged corn flakes to Businesses F and G, the retailers. 
According to Vasiu (Vasiu et ai, 2002) Supply chain management is defined by the Global Supply 
Chain Forum (Lambert and Cooper 2000) as the integration of key business processes from end user 
through original suppliers that provides products, services and information that add value for 
stakeholders. Cooper et al. (1997) argues that the supply chain management evolves through several 
stages of increasing intra- and inter-organisational integration and coordination. In a very broad sense 
and implementation, it spans the entire chain from initial source (supplier's supplier, etc.) to ultimate 
consumer (customer's customer, etc.). 
Pye (Pye et ai, 2005) discussed that the premise of SCM is to get the right product, to the right place, 
at the right time, in the right quantity, for the right price. Once realised, these benefits are then able to 
be transferred to the customer in the form of price reductions and improved service. Of course, the 
ultimate goal of SCM is to put the SC and its cooperating business partners in better strategic 
positions and thereby sustain competitive advantage. (Handfield and Nichols, 1999; Blackwell, 1997; 
Simchi-Levi et ai, 2000; Whitely, 2000; Stultz and Sigler, 2001, Kotabe and Mol 2006 and Wilsner et 
aI2009). 
4. Supply chain and security 
As SCM technologies have continued to develop in complexity, so too have the risks that are posed to 
the businesses that employ them (Vasiu, et ai, 2002). While the Internet has provided unparalleled 
business prospects, the unwary can succumb to a plethora of routinely discovered vulnerability 
exploits in Internet-enabled software. Smith et al (2002) intimate some of main risks that businesses 
are exposed to when doing business on the Internet: 
Current software engineering techniques do not produce systems that are immune to attack; 
Organisations do not have the expertise to defend their systems against attack; 
Cyberspace legislation lags behind current attack trends; 
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• Little evidence to suggest improved security since organisations are continually playing 'catch-up' 
with routinely discovered vulnerabilities; 
• Current security tools only address piecemeal technical aspects of security whereas information 
security is a holistic issue; and, 
• System administration is difficult to manage due to continuous system patching. 
Other research has gone further and determined in details the particular security risks that face SCM 
- -s-ystems,these~include(Smith~etal,2QQ7l~·~· __ · 
Malicious Code and Programs: Malicious Code/Programs, Viruses and Worm, Trojan Horse and 
Logic/Time Bombs 
Malicious Hacking & Intrusion Attempts: Hacking, Denial of Service Attacks, Password 
Sniffing/Cracking Software, IndustriallGovernment Espionage, Eavesdropping, Web Site 
Intrusion/Defacement and Trap Doors 
Fraud and Deception: Fraud, Spoofing, Masquerading, Social Engineering, Salami Attacks and 
Privacylldentity Threats 
Misuse and Sabotage: Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism, Abuse/Misuse of Resources, 
Abuse/Misuse of Privileges, Insiders and Unauthorized Software Changes 
Errors and Omissions: Human Error, Software/Programming Errors, Accidental Entry/Destruction of 
Data by Employees and ProtocollRoutinglTransmission Errors 
Physical and Environmental Hazards: Forces of Nature, Service Disruptions from 3rd Party 
Provider (power, WAN, etc.), Weak, Ineffective, Inadequate Physical Control, Physical 
Data/Equipment Theft and Dumpster Diving 
We now have a situation that the complexity of SCM in terms of technology and associated security 
threats is becoming a problem, quite simply how can the risk be managed? 
5. SCM and risk analysis standards 
Most researchers agree the collaboration and integration benefit of SCM, its effect on IT incidents and 
risk in the supply chain is unknown (Smith et ai, 2007). 
The security issues in relation to SCM have been accepted and a new international security standard 
has been developed, ISO 28000 that focuses upon the security management of supply change 
managernent systems. This Standard is based on the risk methodology known as Plan-Do-Check-Act 
(PDCA). This is structured as (ISO, 2007): 
• Plan: establish the objectives and processes necessary to deliver results in accordance with the 
organisation's security policy; 
B Do: implement the processes; 
a Check: monitor and measure processes against security policy, objectives, targets, legal and 
other requirements, and report results; 
• Act: take actions to continually improve performance of the security management system. 
ISO 28000 requires the organisation to consider the likelihood of an event and all of its consequences 
including (ISO, 2007): 
a Physical failure threats and risks, such as functional failure, incidental damage, malicious damage 
or terrorist or criminal action; 
• Operational threats and risks, including the control of the security, human factors and other 
activities which affect the organisations performance, condition or safety; 
• Natural environmental events (storm, floods, etc.), which may render security measures and 
equipment ineffective; 
Factors outside of the organisation's control, such as failures in externally supplied equipment and 
services. 
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6. SCM case studies 
The following actual real life examples show the impact that failures within Australian SCM systems 
have had. The examples focus upon the state of Victoria, Australia. 
Car industry 
The automotive industry is one of Australia's key manufacturing sectors and an important source of 
-BmploymenCancnesearcn-anchjever6pmenf.-TheincFeasmge){pos-'-t.rreoffne-1\Ustralian--aUf6m6tiVe --
industry to international competition has seen it develop to where it is now competing successfully in 
global markets. There is also a strong inter-dependence between the car makers and their suppliers, 
and strong linkages with the rest of the economy (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2005). 
In August, 2007, 200 workers from Melbourne based plastic parts supplier Venture went on strike in 
regards to $25 million in redundancy entitlements. They supplied the Australian Car Industry with 
many of the parts used in the car manufacturing process. As a consequence of the strike, 1850 
assembly line and engine workers at Ford's Victorian plants in Broadmeadows and Geelong were 
stood down without pay and all manufacturing at those plants ceased (Herald Sun, 2007a; 
News.Com.Au,2007). 
Risk Issue: The actions of a single car parts supplier caused all car manufacturing within the state of 
Victoria to cease for several weeks. The reason for the reliance upon a single provider was cost 
based, e.g. an overseas provider would be more expensive and political and using an overseas 
provider would be seen as taking jobs away from Australia. The outcome of the situation was that 
alternative overseas suppliers were contracted to supply items. 
Power supply 
On 16th January, 2007, 4pm a power blackout impacted Victoria and left 200,0000 homes and 
businesses without electricity as well as disrupting Melbourne's public transport system and road 
network. 
A bushfire at Benalla burnt a main power line cable between Victoria and New South Wales. The 
black out caused about 1,200 traffic signals across the Melbourne and Geelong metropolitan area to 
fail and the power failure interrupted the metropralition train systems within Victoria. SP AusNet 
eventually restored power to the Victorian - New South Wales interconnector powerline on the 1 ih 
January at 12:30 a.m. (Herald Sun, 2007b; The Age, 2007). 
Risk Issue: This example shows how a failure of a critical service such as power could completelty 
disrupte the operation of a SCM. The outcome of this particular situation is that nothing has changed, 
due to the fact that Australia is physically larger than Europe any development of parallel Critical 
Infrastructure to act as a backup, simply would not happen due to the cost and distance involved. This 
is a particular Australian hazard that all Australian organisations have to deal with. 
7. Research issues 
The problems associated with traditional security risk analysis methods are well known (Busuttil and 
Warren, 2005): 
a Existing Security Risk Analysis methods work with organisational systems not complex unbound 
systems impacting at national level e.g. the impact of an attack upon the Internet at a global level 
impacting upon an organisation within Australia; 
There is also the problem of scalability of risks e.g. a risk that poses a threat to the Internet at a 
global level, would have a minimal impact upon an organisation or a single individual; 
The final problem is the concept of embedded risk within risk e.g. a part of an organisational 
system could a minimal threat level or impact level if attacked, but that same systems could have 
a critical impact if attacked when looked at from a national CII view. 
The major issue is the complexity associated with a Supply Chain Management System and risk. This 
is highlighted by Figure 2, where the X represents a possible security risk, which means across the 
SCM there are a number of associated risks. 
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Figure 2: Potential attacks against a supply chain system 
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The 011 - SRA (Organisational Information Infrastructure - Security Risk Analysis) method at a high 
level is concerned about CII protection (Busuttil and Warren, 2002, Busuttil and Warren, 2004, 
Busuttil and Warren, 2005, Warren and Busuttil, 2007). When building an information security 
protection model there are a number of steps that need to be followed. Firstly, a system 
implementation participation group representing a large cross-section of the involved system users 
should undertake the approach as this will assist in the exposition of infrastructure definitions, 
vulnerabilities and countermeasures. For each defined piece of the information infrastructure the 
following information needs to be stored: 
• Infrastructure definitions; 
• An infrastructure vulnerability assessment on each infrastructure level. 
Once a vulnerability assessment has been completed the group can then attempt to map the 
vulnerabilities to areas of infrastructure and organisational responsibility so as to get an overall 
understanding of the problems that face the organisation undertaking this risk analysis approach. 
A problem that has been identified with ISO 2008 is that it does not focus on the security threats of 
technology and the PDCA approach will not be able to deal with the complex processes that exist with 
SCM systems. Therefore 011 - SRA was developed into an approach that could be used to deal with 
Australian SCM systems within a CII environment. 
The next stage of the research is to develop the 011 - SRA approach so that it focuses upon 
protecting the security links between separate parts of the SCM (as shown by Figure 2) and therefore 
protects the overall SCM system by protecting the individual links. This approach to SCM protection is 
taken from a bottom up approach rather than a top down approach. 
8. Conclusion 
The security of the any SCM system is only as strong as its weakest link and therefore it is incumbent 
upon the individual organisational partners that make up the SCM to be proactive in continuously 
improving their security measures. A major area of research that still requires investigation is to 
develop security risks analysis approaches that can effectively protect or indeed pre-empt any likely 
damage resulting from possible threats and vulnerabilities and their subsequent adverse effects on 
the functionality of the SCM. 
The issue with critical SCMs is that any failure will not just impact the SCM partners but could have 
the possibility of impacting entire industrial sectors or impacting Australia as a whole. 
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